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Abstract
When convoking privacy, group membership verification
checks if a biometric trait corresponds to one member of a
group without revealing the identity of that member. Simi-
larly, group membership identification states which group
the individual belongs to, without knowing his/her iden-
tity. A recent contribution provides privacy and security
for group membership protocols through the joint use of
two mechanisms: quantizing biometric templates into dis-
crete embeddings, and aggregating several templates into
one group representation.
This paper significantly improves that contribution be-
cause it jointly learns how to embed and aggregate instead
of imposing fixed and hard coded rules. This is demon-
strated by exposing the mathematical underpinnings of the
learning stage before showing the improvements through an
extensive series of experiments targeting face recognition.
Overall, experiments show that learning yields an excellent
trade-off between security / privacy and the verification /
identification performances.
1. Introduction
The verification that an item, a device or an individual is
a member of a group is a natural task which forms the basis
of many applications granting or refusing access to sensitive
resources (buildings, wifi, payment, conveyor units, . . . ).
Group membership can be implemented through a two-
phase process where an identification is first performed,
revealing the identity of the individual under scrutiny, fol-
lowed by a verification phase where it is checked whether
or not the identified individual is indeed a member of the
claimed group. That implementation breaks privacy: there
is no fundamental reason to identify the individual before
running the verification step. It is easier, but not truly
needed. It is fundamental to distinguish the members of
the group from the non-members, but it does not require to
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distinguish members from one another.
The same comments hold for group identification. Such
a system manages multiple groups, separating e.g. individ-
uals according to the team they work in. The goal is then
to identify the precise group a member belongs to, without
proceeding first to the identification of the individual.
Privacy preserving protocols exist, for the most part in
the area of signal processing in the encrypted domain [19,
4, 13]. These protocols, however, are costly, making them
hard to use in practice.
In contrast, some other approaches propose privacy pre-
serving mechanisms that are cheaper to use because they
solely rely on pure signal processing techniques, excluding
all encryption mechanisms. They tend to be less secure, of
course, but they put in the way of malicious users so many
obstacles that breaking privacy or counterfeiting identities
becomes discouragingly complicated and almost impossi-
ble. At their core, these approaches use for example sketch-
ing or quantization techniques that prohibit reconstructing
identities with sufficient precision [2, 3]. Other techniques
embed real vectors into another representational space with
the purpose of security and privacy [12, 11].
Recently, Gheisari et al. proposed a privacy preserving
group membership verification protocol quantizing iden-
tities’ biometric templates into discrete embeddings and
aggregating multiple embeddings into a group representa-
tion [5]. That scheme has several desirable properties: It
is pure signal processing and linear algebra, hence it is
cheap to run; quantization and aggregation fully succeed to
make reconstruction difficult and impede identification; it is
demonstrated to allow trading-off the strength of its security
against group verification error rates.
That work, however, is fully deterministic in the sense
that it sticks to a set of hard coded rules that drive the way
templates are embedded, how they are grouped and then ag-
gregated into group representations. Although well justified
and sound, these rules govern the behavior of two indepen-
dent procedures, one for embedding, the other for aggregat-
ing. The main contribution of this paper shows that jointly
considering the embedding and aggregation stages results
in better performances, i.e. a better membership verification
without damaging security.
This paper is therefore revisiting the core mechanisms
proposed by Gheisari et al. in [5], by jointly optimizing
the embedding and aggregation stages. It is structured as
follows. Section 2 defines the context of this work and sur-
veys existing approaches. Then, Section 3 gives a formal
problem statement and the details of proposed method are
introduced in Section 4. Section 5 presents the experimental
protocol and results.
2. Context and Related Work
2.1. Context
Without any loss of generality, group membership ver-
ification needs first to acquire templates of items (passive
PUF), devices (active PUF), or individuals (biometric trait)
and to enroll them into a data structure stored in a server.
Then, at verification time, that data structure is queried by
a client with a new template and the access is granted or
refused. Security assesses that the data structure is ade-
quately protected so that a honest but curious server cannot
reconstruct the templates. Privacy requires that verification
should proceed without disclosing the identity.
The nature of templates can vary from one application
to the other. For example, the templates encode informa-
tion related to fingerprints, iris, or faces of individuals, or
to Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF) like speckle pat-
terns captured from laser-illuminated transparent plastic.
It is worth highlighting two fundamental properties of
the templates. The template used at verification time is a
noisy version of the one acquired at enrollment time. Light-
ing conditions, blood pressure, aging, worn-outs, transient
physical conditions are possible factors that might cause
variations at acquisition time. The verification protocol
must be able to absorb such variations and cope with the
continuous nature of the templates. However, it is very un-
likely that a noisy version of the template corresponding
to one group member gets similar enough to the enrolled
template of any other group member. The first property is
therefore in relation with the continuous and distinguishable
nature of the templates. The second property is in relation
with the statistical independence of the enrolled templates.
The traditional operational scenario considers a server
which runs the group membership verification. The server
receives queries from clients. A client acquires a new tem-
plate and then queries the server. Clients are trusted. The
server is honest but curious: It may try to reconstruct the en-
rolled templates or spy on the queries. The design intends to
prevent the server from reconstructing the private template
from the system while correctly determining whether or not
a user is a member of the claimed group (group verification)
or identifying the group of membership (group identifica-
tion).
2.2. Related Work
2.2.1 Cryptography
There exist cryptographic protocols setting a key manage-
ment system to provide the members of a group with anony-
mous authentication [14]. There is no enrollment of bio-
metric or PUF templates since membership is equivalent to
holding one of the valid keys. As for biometry or PUF appli-
cations, our scenario is different from authentication, iden-
tification and secret binding. These applications secure the
templates at the server and/or the client sides, but ultimately
reveal the identity of the user/object.
Signal processing in the encrypted domain can provide
a solution to group membership verification. At enrollment
time, each template is quantized and protected with homo-
morphic encryption. The query is protected in the same
manner at the verification stage. This allows to compute dis-
tances between the query and the templates in the encrypted
domain [19]. There exist protocols for comparing encrypted
results to a threshold [4, 13]. These encrypted comparisons
are sent back to the clients which decrypt and check whether
there is at least one positive. Security and privacy are as
high as the security of the cryptographic primitives. Ho-
momorphic encryption, however, is costly, both in terms of
memory footprint (space) and CPU consumption (time).
2.2.2 Sketching techniques
Group membership is linked to the well-known Bloom filter
that is used to test whether an element is a member of a set.
A Bloom filter hashes and blends elements into one array
of bits. When used in the context of privacy, it was demon-
strated that a server using Bloom filters cannot infer any
information on one specific entry [2]. However, a Bloom
filter can not be used as is in our application, but it needs
two adaptations. First, a Bloom Filter deals with discrete
objects whereas we consider continuous high dimensional
vectors, the templates. We first need to design a quantizer
hashing the continuous templates into discrete objects. That
quantizer must absorb the noise, i.e. the difference between
the enrolled and the fresh template. Second, at verification
time, the hash of the query cannot be sent in the clear for pri-
vacy reasons [3]. For instance, Beck and Kerschbaum pro-
tect the query with partially homomorphic encryption since
there is no need to protect the filter at the server side [1].
2.2.3 Aggregating, Embedding
Aggregating signals into one representation is a very com-
mon mechanism in computer vision. Approaches like BoW
(Bag of Words) [17], VLAD [8], Fisher vectors [10], aggre-
gate some local descriptors extracted from one image into
one global description. However, these approaches are de-
signed to facilitate the identification of similar elements in
images and have no security or privacy capabilities.
Another recent aggregation method better fits with the
security and privacy requirements that we need. In [7], Is-
cen et al. use the group testing paradigm to design a strategy
for packing a random set of image descriptors into a unique
high-dimensional vector. One salient property of that strat-
egy is that the similarity between images can be determined
by solely comparing these (few) aggregated vectors to the
description of the query, without the need of the original
(and numerous) raw image descriptors. This saves space
(memory footprint of the database) and time (complexity at
query time). These gains are the main motivation of [7].
As for the embedding, our scenario is similar to a
privacy-preserving identification mechanism based on spar-
sifying transform [12, 11]. It obtains a sparse ternary em-
bedding preserving locality information while ensuring pri-
vacy of the data users and security of the templates.
Indeed, paper [5] uses the aggregation methods designed
in [7] combined with the sparsifying transform [12, 11].
Our design resorts to this latter mechanism for inheriting
its privacy-preserving properties as well, yet we replace the
former ad-hoc hard coded rules of [7] by a machine learning
approach.
2.2.4 Face recognition
Aggregating templates into one group representation also
exists in face recognition, but privacy and security are not
a requirement in the design of this primitive. They are usu-
ally taken into account with an extra layer (see Sect. 2.2.1).
In a common approach, multiple face captures of the same
person are combined to gain robustness against poses, ex-
pression, and quality variations [21]. In our scenario, the
group is composed of unique faces of different persons.
Paper [20] computes a single compact descriptor for the
faces of celebrities appearing in the same picture. The query
is a small set of face descriptors and their system returns
photos where these celebrities appear altogether. This pa-
per consists in jointly learning the face description and the
aggregation mechanism. The authors report “a minimal loss
of discriminability up to two faces per image, and degrades
slowly after that”.
Our paper deals with the aggregation for a given on-the-
shelf face descriptor. On one hand, our setup is easier be-
cause the query is a single face. On the other hand, our
group typically comprises more than two faces, and each is
possibly captured according to very different conditions.
3. Problem Formulation
This section details the way the group membership prob-
lem is formulated and also defines the metrics used to eval-
uate performances.
3.1. Notations
The set of individuals is denoted as [N ] := {1, . . . , N},
partitionned into M groups: [N ] =
⋃
g∈[M ] Sg . The size of
a group S is denoted by |S|. In the experiments of Sect. 5,
all the groups share the same size denoted as m.
The templates to be enrolled are the vectors {x1, . . . ,
xN} ⊂ Rd. They are stored column wise in d × N ma-
trix X according to the partition over the groups: X =
[X1, . . . ,XM ], where Xg stores the templates belonging to
Sg , ∀g ∈ [M ]. The output of the enrollment is a `×M ma-
trix R = [r1, . . . , rM ] composed of the representations of
the M groups. It is imposed that the group representations
are quantized and sparse: rg ∈ A` with A := {−1, 0, 1}
and ‖rg‖0 ≤ S < `, ∀g ∈ [M ]. Moreover, the analysis is
restricted to the case where ` ≤ d.
The template for which the membership has to be veri-
fied is a query vector y ∈ Rd that is cast onto A` thanks
to an embedding before being compared to the group repre-
sentations.
3.2. Embedding
Function e : Rd → A` maps a vector to a sequence
of ` discrete symbols. We intentionally choose the sparsi-
fying transform coding described in [12, 11] for its secu-
rity and privacy good properties. It projects x ∈ Rd on
the column vectors of W ∈ Rd×`. The output alphabet
A = {−1, 0,+1} is imposed by quantizing the components
of W>x. The ` − S components having the lowest ampli-
tude are set to 0. The S remaining ones are quantized to +1
or -1 according to their sign.
e : Rd → A` (1)
x 7→ e(x) = TS(WTx).
3.3. Performances Metrics
Paper [5] defines metrics to assess (i) the ability of the
protocol to correctly perform the verification task, and (ii)
the security and privacy.
3.3.1 Verification Performance
The first metrics is seeded by considering the following two
hypotheses:
• H1: The query is related to one of the vectors of group
g. For instance, it is a noisy version of vector j, y =
xj + n, with n to be a noise vector and j ∈ Sg .
• H0: The query is not related to any vector in the group.
The group membership test decides which hypothesis is
deemed true by comparing e(y) to rg . This is done by first
computing a score function c and thresholding its result:
t := [c(e(y), rg) > τ ].
The probabilities of false negative, pfn(τ) := P(t =
0|H1), and false positive, pfp(τ) := P(t = 1|H0) are sum-
marized by the AUC (Area Under the ROC Curve). Pa-
per [5] also considers pfn(τ) for τ s.t. pfp(τ) = ε, a required
false positive level, 0.05 for example.
3.3.2 Security and Privacy Performance
A curious server can reconstruct the query template y from
its embedding: ŷ := rec(e(y)). This endangers privacy of
the querying user. The mean squared error assesses how
accurate is this reconstruction:
MSEP = d
−1
E(‖Y − rec(e(Y))‖2), (2)
assuming that Y is a white gaussian vector in Rd.
As for the security of the enrolled templates, a curious
server can only reconstruct a single vector x̂ from the aggre-
gated representation, and this vector serves as an estimation
of any template in the group:
MSES = (dN)
−1
M∑
g=1
|Sg|∑
i=1
E(‖xi − x̂g‖2). (3)
4. Proposed Method
4.1. Variants of the Protocol
Our group membership protocol is based on embedding
and aggregation functions. Whereas the embedding func-
tion e is fixed, we can have two constructions: The aggre-
gation of embeddings or the embedding of the aggregation.
EoA aggregates raw templates into one vector of Rd, and
then embeds this vector. Then, the group representative vec-
tor rg is computed as:
rg = e(aEoA(Xg)), (4)
where Xg is the d×|Sg|matrix storing the templates of the
g-th group.
AoE first embeds each template according to (1) before
aggregating them into rg:
rg = aAoE
(
{e(xi)}i∈Sg
)
. (5)
This work aims at learning the aggregated vectors and
the embeddings jointly. For both construction, this is done
by minimizing an objective function summing a cost for
embedding CE and a cost for aggregating CA.
For AoE (first embed, then aggregate), denote E ∈
A`×N the matrix storing the embeddings of the enrolled
templates. Like for X, we write E := [E1, . . . ,EM ] with
Eg the matrix gathering the embeddings of the templates of
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Figure 1: Overview
group Sg . For EoA (first aggregate, then embed), denote
A := [a1, . . . ,aM ] ∈ Rd×M the matrix gathering the ag-
gregations of the templates enrolled in a group.
Matrices E and A will be defined through optimization
problems detailed below. For the embedding, function e
is still prototyped according to Sect. 3.2. Papers [12, 11]
show that privacy and security stem from the sparsifying
transform. Only its matrix W is learned.
For EoA, Fig. 1 shows that it starts from X to create
A before outputting R using matrix W. This defines the
optimization problem:
min
A,W,R
γCAEoA(X,A) + C
E
EoA(A,R,W), (6)
where γ is the penalty parameter, A ∈ Rd×M , W ∈ Rd×`,
and R ∈ A`×M .
On the other hand, Fig. 1 shows that for AoE, we start
from X to create E using matrix W before outputting the
group representations R. This defines the optimization
problem:
min
E,W,R
CEAoE(X,W,E) + ξC
A
AoE(E,R), (7)
with E ∈ A`×M , W ∈ Rd×`, and R ∈ A`×M .
Under both constructions, the optimization is joint be-
cause the embedding and the aggregating costs share a com-
mon variable (A or E). What follows define the costs and
solve the optimization problems.
4.2. AoE: Aggregation of Embeddings
This scheme first embeds and then aggregates by solv-
ing (7). The cost for embedding is defined as
CEAoE(X,W,E) :=
N∑
i=1
∥∥ei −W>xi∥∥22 , (8)
= ‖E−W>X‖2F . (9)
This term represents the fidelity penalty of an embedding e
w.r.t. a template x in the transformed domain.
For each group of embedded templates, the aggregated
vector should satisfy some properties as well:
• For each group the overall distance between group
members and the aggregated vector is minimized.
• Aggregated vector should be represented as a sparse
ternary code.
The cost of aggregation is then defined as
CAAoE(E,R) :=
M∑
g=1
‖Eg − rg1>|Sg|‖
2. (10)
We add the following constraints:
W>W = I`, (11)
‖ei‖0 ≤ S, ∀i ∈ [N ] (12)
‖rg‖0 ≤ S ∀g ∈ [M ]. (13)
The constraint makes sure that the representative r is sparse,
ternary, and diverse.
We propose to optimize problem (7) iteratively by alter-
nating updates of one parameter while fixing the remain-
ing ones. Each step minimizes the total cost function lower
bounded by 0, insuring a convergence to a local minimum.
W-Step. We fix E and R and update W by solving:
min
W
∥∥E−W>X∥∥2
F
s.t. W>W = I`
(14)
This problem is a least square Procruste problem with or-
thogonality constraint. By setting S := XE>, [15] shows
that W = UV>, where U contains the eigenvectors corre-
sponding to the ` (` < d) largest eigenvalues of SS> and V
contains the eigenvectors of S>S.
E-Step. W and R being fixed, we can solve the problem
for each Eg independently: ∀g ∈ [M ],
min
Eg
∥∥Eg −W>Xg∥∥2F + ξ ∥∥∥Eg − rg1>|Sg|∥∥∥2F
s.t. Eg ∈ A`×|Sg|, ‖ei‖0 ≤ S, ∀i ∈ Sg.
(15)
According to [12], we first find the solution without consid-
ering the constraints and then apply ternarization function
TS (1) to obtain sparse codes. Therefore Eg is found as:
Eg = TS(W
>Xg + ξrg1
>
|Sg|). (16)
R-Step. Like for the E-step, updating each group repre-
sentation rg is done independently, while fixing W and E:
min
rg
∥∥∥Eg − rg1>|Sg|∥∥∥2F
s.t. rg ∈ A`, ‖rg‖0 ≤ S.
(17)
Then the representative of g-th group is obtained as:
rg = TS(Eg1|Sg|). (18)
4.3. EoA: Embedding of Aggregation
We now consider the construction of (6) that first aggre-
gates and then embeds. The cost of the aggregation is de-
fined as:
CAEoA(X,A) :=
M∑
g=1
∥∥X>g ag − 1|Sg|∥∥22 + η ‖ag‖22 . (19)
Minimizing this cost amounts to equalize the similarity be-
tween each members of the group and the aggregated vector
a. The cost for embedding is defined as previously:
CEEoA(A,R,W) := ‖R−W>A‖2F . (20)
As for the constraints:
W>W = I`, (21)
rg ∈ A`, ‖rg‖0 ≤ S, ∀g ∈ [M ]. (22)
The optimization problem (6) with these costs and con-
straints is solved by iterating the following steps.
W- Step. Like for (14), updating W while R, A are fixed
is a Procruste problem under orthogonality constraint:
min
W
∥∥R−W>A∥∥2
F
,
s.t. W>W = I`.
(23)
Similar to (14), we define S := AR>. The solution is
found as W = UV>, where U contains the eigenvectors
corresponding to the ` largest eigenvalues of SS> and V
the eigenvectors of S>S.
A- Step. When fixing W and R, the aggregated vector
for each group g ∈ [M ] is found independently by mini-
mizing:
min
ag
∥∥rg −W>ag∥∥22 + γ(∥∥X>g ag − 1|Sg|∥∥22 + η ‖ag‖22),
(24)
whose solution is
ag = (WW
> + γ(XgX
>
g + ηId))
−1
(Wrg + γXg1|Sg|).
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Figure 2: Performances comparison of our schemes vs. baseline for varying group size m. Pfn at Pfp = 0.05 for group
verification (solid), the first step of group identification (dashed), and Pε for the second step of group identification (dotted).
R- Step. Projection matrix W and the group aggregations
A are fixed. The group representatives are obtained by ap-
plying sparse ternarization function on the projected aggre-
gated vectors: R = TS(W>A).
5. Experiments
We fully implemented the group membership protocol
that is described in [5]. Experimenting with this implemen-
tation gives the baseline performances. Note that the exper-
imental part of [5] only deals with synthetic data. Our im-
plementation could reproduce these results. However, the
sequel presents comparisons on real data.
5.1. Experimental Setup
We evaluate the performances of our scheme with face
recognition. Face images are coming from LFW [6],
CFP [16] and FEI [18] databases. Face descriptors are ob-
tained from a pre-trained network based on VGG-Face ar-
chitecture [9]. The output vector of the penultimate layer
(i.e. before the final classifier layer) is PCA reduced to a
lower dimension (d = 1, 024 for LFW and CFP, d = 256
for FEI database), and then L2-normalized. The result is
the template x ∈ Rd. The values of `, S, ξ, γ and η are set
empirically as 0.9d, 0.7l, 1, 104 and 1 respectively. Also,
not all individuals from these databases are enrolled.
LFW. Labeled Faces in the Wild contains 13,233 images
of faces collected from the web. We used cropped LFW im-
ages. The enrollment set consists ofN = 1, 680 individuals
with at least two images in the LFW database. One random
template of each individual is enrolled in the system, play-
ing the role of xi. The other templates are used for queries.
These are partitioned into two subsets: templates that are
correlated with xi with a similarity bigger than 0.95 form
the “easy queries” set ; the remaining templates with a sim-
ilarity bigger than 0.9 form the “hard queries” set. The re-
maining individuals not enrolled in the system (5, 749−N )
play the role of impostors (hypothesisH0).
CFP. The Celebrities in Frontal-Profile (CFP) database is
composed of 500 subjects with 10 frontal and 4 profile im-
ages for each subject in a wild setting. We only use the
frontal images. The impostor set is a random selection of
100 individuals. One random template of the remaining
individuals is enrolled in the system. Like the setting de-
scribed for LFW, we have two subsets of queries.
FEI. We use frontal and pre-aligned images of the Brazil-
ian FEI database. There are 200 subjects with two frontal
images (one with a neutral expression and the other with a
smiling facial expression). The database is created by ran-
dom sampling 150 individuals. For each identity, one ran-
dom image is enrolled while the other is used as query. The
remaining individuals are considered as impostors.
At the enrollment phase, all groups have exactly the
same number of members: |Sg| = m,∀g ∈ [M ]. Indi-
viduals are randomly assigned to a group.
The performances of the system are gauged with error
probabilities evaluated by Monte Carlo estimator over the
testing set. Since N is not so large, the confidence interval
at 95% is≈ ±N−1/2 = ±2.5%, which prevents us from es-
timating small probabilities. Therefore, we put our system
under stress by selecting a hard setup. First, note that LFW
and CFP are difficult datasets due to the ‘in the wild’ vari-
ations (poses, illuminations, expressions and occlusions).
They do not reflect the application of accessing a building
(as mentioned in the Introduction) where the capture envi-
ronment is more under control and the individuals collabo-
rate. Second, not only the dimension of the templates have
been reduced but also the length of the embeddings and the
group representation (` = 0.9d) with a sparsity of S = 0.7l
(unless stated otherwise). Probabilities of errors are then big
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Figure 3: The Detection and Identification Rate (DIR) vs. Pfp for group identification. Performances for hard queries are
plotted in dashed lines.
but measurable with accuracy. We believe that this protocol
makes sense to benchmark approaches.
Two applications scenarios are investigated: group veri-
fication and group identification.
Group verification. A user claims she/he belongs to
group g. This claim is true under hypothesis H1 and false
under hypothesis H0 (i.e. the user is an impostor). Her/his
template y is embedded, and (h(y), g) is sent to the sys-
tem, which compares h(y) to the group representation rg .
The system accepts (t = 1) or rejects (t = 0) the claim.
This is a two hypothesis test with two probabilities of er-
rors: Pfp := P(t = 1|H0) is the false positive rate and
Pfn := P(t = 0|H1) is the false negative rate. The figure of
merit is Pfn when Pfp = 0.05.
Group identification. The scenario is an open set identi-
fication where the querying user is either enrolled or an im-
postor. The system has two steps. First, it decides whether
or not this user is enrolled. This is verification as above,
except that the group is unknow: The system computes
δj = ‖h(y)−rj‖, ∀j ∈ [M ]. The system accepts (t = 1) if
the minimum of these M distances is below a given thresh-
old τ . The figure of merit is Pfn when Pfp = 0.05.
When t = 1, the system proceeds to the second step.
The estimated group is given by ĝ = argminj∈[M ] δj . The
figure of merit for this second step is Pε := P(ĝ 6= g) or the
Detection and Identification RateDIR := (1−Pε)(1−Pfn).
5.2. Exp. #1: Comparison to the baseline
Figure 2 shows that our method brings improvement
compared to the baseline, since the AoE and the EoA plots
are way below the ones corresponding to the baseline. The
high probabilities of false negatives for the baseline are
caused by the great losses in information: AoE (Baseline)
looses information from each template it embeds before the
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Figure 4: The Detection and Identification Rate (DIR) vs.
Pfp for group identification on FEI.
aggregation—the accumulated losses are therefore great;
EoA (Baseline) has better performances since plain tem-
plates are first aggregated before running the embedding
step which causes less information loss.
Our method does not suffer that much from this informa-
tion loss: EoA and AoE have roughly similar performances,
with much more acceptable Pfn values.
5.3. Exp. #2: Detection and Identification Rate
Figure 3 compares the DIR performances for group
identification with m = 16. Our schemes have results close
to perfection on the FEI dataset. Easy queries are correctly
handled on CFP but not on the LFW dataset at this size of
group. Hard queries are more difficult to cope with. This
is explained by the poor correlations they have with their
corresponding xi. That poor correlation, already existing
on the original templates, before any embedding or aggre-
gation, can only lower the performances of any membership
identification scheme.
Figure 4 shows the impact of the size of group on DIR.
Packing more templates into one group representation is
detrimental even if the queries are well correlated with
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Figure 5: The impact of the similarity of the query with the
enrolled template on group verification and identification.
their corresponding enrolled template. This suggests to
split large groups into subgroups of size lower or equal to
m = 32. This restricts privacy tom-anonymity as the server
is now able to identify the subgroup a query belongs to.
5.4. Exp. #3: Easy vs. Hard Queries
Figure 5 gives an additional perspective on the phe-
nomenon highlighted above, that is, the genuine similarity
between the query and the enrolled template is a key factor.
Easy queries are very well handled whereas hard queries
are more problematic. Put differently, the proposed method
do not severely degrade the recognition power of the de-
scriptors obtained through the VGG16 network. Descrip-
tors poorly correlated already at the image level can only
cause poor performance once embedded and aggregated.
This is also shown in Fig. 7 which displays some enrolled
and querying faces of the ‘in the wild’ datasets LFW and
CFP. All the failed identification examples show a change
of lighting, pose or expression, and / or occlusion. Yet, such
changes do not automatically give a failure.
5.5. Exp. #4: Security and Privacy
As for the security and privacy, the quantities (2) and (3)
were measured as empirical average over the dataset.
Knowing that the query has unit norm, the reconstruc-
tion mechanism yields a unit vector as follows: ŷ =
We(y)/‖We(y)‖. The quality of the reconstruction
mainly depends on the sparsity factor S. When S is small,
the template is reconstructed with few columns of W.
When S is big, more columns are used but the amplitude
modulating each column is coarsely reconstructed. There
might be two values of S, one small, one large, providing
the same reconstruction MSE. However, these two values
do not yield the same performances as shown in Fig. 6.
Reconstructing enrolled templates is even more difficult
due to the aggregation (see (3)). Fig. 6 shows that our
method has decreased the security a little, but overall the
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Figure 6: The impact of sparsity factor S on the trade-off
between security and performances, on FEI with m = 32
and S/d ∈ (0.1, 1).
Figure 7: Examples of group identification on CFP(left)
and LFW(right). Blue frames indicate enrolled samples,
green / red frames successful / failed queries, respectively.
trade-off between security and performances is more inter-
esting especially for AoE.
6. Conclusion
This paper proposes a framework for group membership
verification and identification by jointly learning the em-
bedding and the aggregation. Yet, this learning was not
completely free. Some guidances were still imposed, espe-
cially the prototyping of the embedding based on a sparse
ternary quantization. This is mainly for inheriting security
and privacy properties of this lossy information process-
ing [12, 11]. It is not clear whether an alternative approach
does exist.
Our future work looks at increasing the length of the
group representation in order to pack more templates into a
group. Yet, this raises scalability issues appealing for faster
but approximative learning.
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